(Note: This article was originally posted by Hong Kong Free Free Press, on Nov. 28, 2020, under the title:  “No Stone Left Unturned: The Basic Law Hong Kongers Thought They Knew Is Being Demolished”

No stone left unturned should be the code name for Hong Kong’s new life under national security rule. It began four months ago, on July First, the anniversary of Hong Kong’s 1997 return to Chinese rule. This new order followed from the central government’s promulgation of a mainland-style national security law late in the evening of June 30.  ( a ) 

The letter and the spirit of the new law are being enforced in multiple ways that include formal court proceedings and the decisions of officials both here and in Beijing. Their reach is all-encompassing. Nothing seems to be off limits, not Hong Kong’s heretofore independent judiciary and certainly not Hong Kong’s legislature, which has suffered the severest blows. 

Gathering further momentum, the rectification campaign has now been extended even to Hong Kong’s Basic Law itself. That it should reach this ultimate plateau of legal authority seems inevitable since the new National Security Law is being enforced in ways that directly contravene postcolonial Hong Kong’s most basic legal safeguard.  

THE ORIGINAL GUARANTEES 

Hong Kong’s Basic Law was drafted under Beijing’s supervision and promulgated in 1990, to serve as Hong Kong’s constitution after 1997. But the new law also reflected much of the intent negotiated beforehand and written into the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declarationwhich spelled out the terms of Hong Kong’s transfer from British to Chinese rule.   

 When skeptics said there was no reason to celebrate since the agreement that led to the declaration came with no enforcement mechanisms, its British defenders said no matter. Aleast everything had been written down in plain language for all the world to seeChinese leaders could be trusted to honor their word before such an audience.  

Among the general principles included in the Joint Declaration were promises about the “high degree of autonomy” that post-1997 Hong Kong would enjoy — to include executive, legislative, and independent judicial power. Hong Kong’s Chief Executive would be appointed by the central government in Beijingbut on the basis of elections or consultations held locally in Hong Kong. Social and economic systems would remain unchangedwith all civil rights and freedoms to be ensured by law.   

Beijing elaborated on the promises in Annexes to the Declaration. Accordingly, its promises would be written into a Basic Law to be used in governing Hong Kong after 1997. The legislature “shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities “shall be accountable to the legislature. A Hong Kong prosecutorial authority “shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference,” and much more. 

Beijing kept its word. The new Basic Law constitution was promulgated in April 1990. The date was less than a year after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown in Beijing that marked the end of China’s own democracy movement.   

Nevertheless, Hong Kong’s new law contained all the same promises outlined in the 1984 Joint Declaration and went into effect on July 1, 1997.  It was advertised as “onecountry, two-systems,” a phrase that became the standard reference for Hong Kong’s governing principles.  

Thereafter, a new generation grew up memorizing the promises and living by them. The promises also motivated the growth of a democracy movement that set its goals and organized its campaigns to accommodate the Basic Law’s vague timetables. These promised “gradual and orderly” progress toward universal suffrage elections for both the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council (articles 45, 68). That progress could commence in 2007.  

As 2007 drew near, Beijing issued a decision delaying the commencement date for another decade. Hong Kong’s first universal suffrage election for Hong Kong’s Chief Executive was tentatively scheduled for 2017. It was only then, during the preparatory campaigning in 2014-15, that Beijing officials finally revealed what was meant by a universal suffrage election, namely one where Beijing first determined the candidates. 

Everyone essentially overlooked the Basic law’s Article 5, which contained a different kind of promise. It declared cryptically that “the socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in Hong Kong” and “the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.” There has never been any kind of explanation as to the meaning of Article 5. 

REFORMULATING THE BASIC LAW’S PROMISES:  A Preview from Leung Chun-ying 

In May this year, shortly before Beijing’s surprise announcement about the imminent promulgation of a National Security Law for Hong Kong, former Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying posted a curious commentary on his blog site. At the time, it seemed like just another of his flippant putdowns targeting Hong Kong’s pro-democracy partisans and their foreign friends b   

CY, as he is known, was Hong Kong’s Chief Executive between 2012 and 20 17. He stepped down after only one term, ostensibly for personal reasons, but more likely because his abrasive personality was adding further tension to Hong Kong’s volatile political atmosphere  

Leung’s May 19 blog post was true to form. He presented his thoughts as a series of answers to questions from “alien” visitors who might arrive from outer space knowing nothing about the local form of government or Hong Kong’s relationship with its Motherland.  

In retrospect, Leung was previewing some new formulations about the Basic Law’s promises, which must have been taking shape in Beijing while the National Security Law was being finalized. Or perhaps the ideas were not new and had only been kept under wraps in anticipation of future use.  

But whatever the case, Leung was in effect introducing Beijing’s current thinking about the old Basic Law promises that people here had been living by since 1990. Evidently those promises, as originally understood, are being airbrushed from the public record in deference to new formulations more to Beijing’s liking. 

The immediate context of Leung’s literary intervention was a blast from Beijing in April, criticizing pro-democracy legislators for their filibustering and other delaying tactics in the Legislative Council, (  c  )   Hong Kong critics pushed back, reminding Beijing of the Basic Law’s article 22. It promised that no department of the central government may interfere in Hong Kong affairs.   

 Article 12 overrides all else, responded Beijing’s defenders. Article 12 says Hong Kong is directly under the central government in Beijing, suggesting that it can intervene directly in Hong Kong affairs. The people of Hong Kong are not sovereign, wrote Leung. He reminded his readers that Britain returned sovereignty to the central government in Beijing, not the people of Hong Kong. 

 But that same Article 12 also grants Hong Kong autonomy. Leung did his best to explain the contradiction. Hong Kong did not have its own power before it was returned to China and rechristened as a Special Administrative Region within the People’s Republic. Therefore, all of Hong Kong’s power or autonomy was granted afterward, by the central government and derives therefrom — Beijing’s to give and Beijing’s to take away.  

Thus, executive, legislativeand judicial power in HK all derive from the same source, namely, the central government. There is no local power. In return, Hong Kong and its people are responsible for defending China’s sovereignty and national security.   

Hong Kong does enjoy autonomy in terms of finances and local taxation. But even this local power is enjoyed only by reason of the consent and support of the Chinese people, as administered by the central government. 

Hong Kong’s system is executive led because its government is made up of principal officials who are appointed both by the Chief Executive here and by the central government in Beijing.  

It is true that Hong Kong’s executive-led government is accountable to the Hong Kong legislature. But that accountability is confined to only four limited areas.  

One such area is the implementation of laws passed by the Legislative Councilalthough such legislation cannot be initiated by the council itself. Also, the Chief Executive is required to present regular policy addresses to the Legislative Council, and to answer questions from legislators during question timeFinally, government budgets and taxation plans must be approved by the Legislative Council. 

Powers are not separated. Nor were they under British rule. The judiciary is independent. But the relationship between the executive and legislature is not one of separation pawers.   

UNDER NATIONAL SECURITIY RULE 

Leung Chun-ying’s musings were a preview of all that is coming to pass. The National Security Law criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorism — meaning political violence, and collusion with foreign powers for the purpose of interfering in Hong Kong affairs. The law is not retroactive. 

To ensure proper implementation according to mainland standards, a contingent of mainland public security officials took up residence here immediately after the law was promulgated. Beijing’s local Liaison Office representative now sits on the Chief Executive’s new advisory committee, and a group of Hong Kong judges have been especially designated by the Chief Executive to hear national security cases. 

Still not satisfied, Beijing’s long-standing reservations about Hong Kong’s judiciary have turned into a frontal assault. Earlier complaints targeted local judges’ alleged penchant for molly-coddling political miscreants. Now there are calls for wholesale reforms that violate the most basic tenets of judicial independence ( d  ) 

 Despite some serious pushback from within the judiciary itself and from legal professionals, the plaintiffs are not retreating. Besides naming and attempting to shame individual judges whose rulings are giving the benefit of the doubt to too many of last year’s street protesters, demands now are for fixed rules to standardize penalties and limit judges’ flexibility in sentencing. 

 But beyond these details of judicial administration is the campaign to include judicial reform as part of Beijing’s new focus on the Basic Law itselfLeung Chun-ying ‘s message to alien visitors pointed the way.  

Director Zhang Xiaoming of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing has again taken the lead. Zhang was the official whose remarks last June presented the National Security Law as something of a minor intrusion that would target only a “very few” misbehaving Hong Kongers. 

He addressed the current challenge directly in another online seminar, this one on November 17In this presentation, Zhang referred to Hong Kong’s Basic Law as a “living law,” meaning one that needs to be amplified and adapted over time with the addition of new legislation and interpretations.  

Such interventions are needed to accommodate problems that have appeared during the past two decades of implementation. The aim is to ensure Hong Kong’s wellbeing during the next 26 years …  a rare reference to the 50-year cutoff date mentioned in the Basic Law’s Article 5. 

Zhang blamed misunderstandings and misconceptions about Hong Kong’s governing principles for the recent troubles here including last year’s street protests. All were the result of failure to comprehend the true nature of Hong Kong’s status as defined by the Basic Law — which is nevertheless a work in constant motion as problems arise and solutions sought. 

The immediate context for his November 17 presentation was a new decision by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC). Issued on November 11, the decision re-set the qualifications for legislators and public officials in accordance with the standards of the National Security Law.  ( e  )             

Hence, Legislative Councilors — who promote or support the idea of Hong Kong independence, or who refuse to recognize China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong, or who seek interference by foreign forces, or commit other acts endangering national security — do not comply with the legal requirements for upholding the Basic Law.  

The new November 11 NPCSC decision reinforces the previous 2016 NPCSC decision that strengthened the provisions of Basic Law Article 104, on oath-taking. That decision precipitated the long-running oath-taking saga that carried on through multiple court appeals but ultimately did what it was intended to do with the disqualification of six legislators. The November 11 decision shortcircuits all the formalities and eliminates the possibility of court appeals. 

The decision was also specific. It applied to the current Legislative Councilors who had been ruled ineligible to stand as candidates in the next electionoriginally scheduled for September 6. The decision also applies to any future candidate or member of the Legislative Council. Sitting members may be summarily expelled by the government without following the Basic Law’s stipulated procedure for removing legislators from office 

According to the original Basic Law procedure for removing a legislator, the person must be censured for misbehavior or breach of oath by a vote of two-thirds of the Legislative Council members present (Article 79). 

Immediately after the November 11 NPCSC decision was issued, the Hong Kong government used its new authority to disqualify and expel four legislators, albeit, for actcommitted BEFORE the National Security Law went into effect on June 30.   

The four had already been disqualified as prospective candidates for the next Legislative Council election, originally scheduled for September 6before it was postponed due to a new upsurge of coronavirus flu infections. The four had recanted their past actions but the candidatevetting officials disqualified them anyway on grounds their new declarations of loyalty were probably not sincere.   

Zhang Xiaomng elaborated further, addressing three points that have inspired years of debate and controversy. Anti-China activism by legislators and public servants will not be tolerated. He revived a statement from the 1980s, attributed to the then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. 

 He said many things including other statements that seemed to contradict this one. But while the Basic Law drafting process was underway, Deng was quoted as saying that only patriots should govern Hong Kong. That qualification is now a legal requirement, said Zhang.  Only patriots can govern Hong Kong.  Anti-China activists need not apply. 

 He also said the judiciary must be reformed because its rulings had put the wrong slant on Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Perhaps this followed from the common practice of considering precedents from other jurisdictions unrelated to China and its laws. Zhang cited retired Judge Henry Litton’s current drive for judicial reform and said officials were now working on plans for reforming Hong Kong’s judiciary. 

Finally, Hong Kong’s Basic Law constitutional system must also be reformed in order to replace misconceptions with correct principles inspired by patriotic love-of-country (Nov. 18: South China Morning PostStandardMing Pao, Ta Kung Pao).   ( f ) 

 

(a)     https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/01/in-full-english-translation-of-the-hong-kong-national-security-law/ 

 ( b )   https://mailchi.mp/cb271f396787/65o7zhtlog?e=7f5b97c0d0 . 

 (  c  )    https://hongkongfp.com/2020/04/20/explainer-beijings-5-day-crackdown-on-hong-kongs-opposition-during-covid-19/ 

 ( d )  How judges became the last front line in the battle for Hong Kong’s freedoms | Hong Kong Free Press HKFP (hongkongfp.com) 

 ( e )  (受權發布)全國人民代表大會常務委員會關于香港特別行政區立法會議員資格問題的決定-新華網 (xinhuanet.com) 

 ( f )  https://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news/section/2/224866/Patriotism-over-democracy,-freedompost

 

Posted by Suzanne Pepper on Nov. 30, 2020

hkfocus2017@gmail.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

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